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Acronyms 
AKP: The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) is a moderate 
conservative-Islamic political party. The party has been in power since 2002. 
CHP: The Republican People‟s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) is the oldest political party 
in Turkey. It was founded by Atatürk and is devoted to the 6 Kemalist principles, most 
notably secularism.  
HDP: The People‟s Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) is a left-wing Kurdish 
political party. The party first entered the General Assembly in 2015. 
HSYK: The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu) 
is responsible for the appointment of judges and public prosecutors. 
MGK: The National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) is responsible for the national 
security policy. The military used the MGK to direct domestic and foreign policies. 
PKK: The Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) is an armed separatist 
group. It has been classed as a terrorist organization by several countries and international 
organizations, including the Turkish government, the United States and NATO. 
YAŞ: The Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askerî Şûra) is responsible for the promotion, 
assignments and dismissal of high ranking military officers. 
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Changes in Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and growing civil Authoritarianism 
(2007- 2017) 
Introduction  
On the night of the 15
th
 July 2016 Turkey was rocked by an attempted coup d‟état by 
a fraction of the Turkish Armed Forces. Throughout the night rebellious armed forces battled 
government loyal security forces and thousands of protestors. By the morning of the 16
th
 July 
the coup d‟état had failed and hundreds of security forces and civilians had been killed and 
thousands had been wounded. Immediately after the failed coup, purges unseen in Turkish 
history ensued. The attempted coup d‟état, the following widespread purges, alleged human 
rights abuses and the extensive state of emergency are the latest chapter in the increased 
instability of Turkey and the growing authoritarianism by the AKP government under Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. The growing instability is particularly troubling as Turkey is a key NATO 
ally and located in an unstable region, bordering Syria and Iraq. It has also taken a leading 
role countering the refugee crisis which has engulfed Europe over the last two years. 
 Political instability and military interventions are not uncommon in Turkey. 
Throughout its young history Turkey has experienced several military interventions in which 
its military ousted elected governments. The military interventions were staged in 1960, 
1971, 1980 and 1997. However, it has to be stated that in all four cases the military 
intervened as it referred to “to save the democracy from itself” or to protect Turkey from a 
perceived threat to its state ideology “Kemalism”, most notably secularism. It further has to 
be noted that the military never intended to set up a long term military government (Heper, 
2005; 216). After each intervention the military adopted new constitutions or made 
amendments to the existing constitutions in order to strengthen the military‟s influence in 
politics thus favouring the military in Turkish civil-military relations turning the military into 
the hegemonic institution.  However, the latest attempted coup d‟état came to a surprise to 
many observers and political analysts. This is partly due to the recent shift in civil-military 
relations and the government‟s subordination of the Turkish Armed Forces. The civil military 
relations are an integral part of a modern liberal democracy. However, unlike modern liberal 
democracies Turkey did not fully democratise but instead critics and certain scholars claim 
Turkey has turned more authoritarian than it was under its previous military tutelage. 
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The paper will further examine the link of the changing civil-military relations and the effect 
it had on democracy and authoritarianism in Turkey. The research question for this paper is: 
How has the shift in civil-military relations affected authoritarianism in Turkey (2007-2017)?  
The paper will add to the existing literature on civil-military relations in Turkey and 
the growing authoritarian trend by the civil government. It will assess the link between the 
recent shift of the civil-military relations and to what extent it has influenced the governments 
increasing authoritarian trend. Even though the paper focuses on events after 2007 it will 
examine important developments prior to 2007 as it is important to comprehend the Turkish 
military and its history of unstable coalition governments and continuing coups in which the 
military strengthened its influence in politics. The paper will include the recent attempted 
coup d‟état on July, 16 2016 and the referendum on the constitutional change on April, 16 
2017 as both had a significant impact on the Turkish military and politics.  
Process tracing will be used to answer the thesis question. By using process tracing it 
is possible to assess sequential events which affected and gradually changed the civil-military 
relations in Turkey between 2007 and 2017 and how it is connected to the increasing 
authoritarianism of the AKP government. Firstly, it is necessary to comprehend the Turkish 
military and its role in society and politics and the reasons for its importance. The second 
chapter will analyse the events which altered the civil-military relations and weakened the 
military‟s position domestically. The events include fabricated coup plots, attempted coups 
(2016) and subsequent arrests, legislative changes, constitutional amendments, but also 
changes in public opinion on the military. As the military weakened the government 
strengthened its control over the military thus shifting the civil-military relations. The second 
chapter will also examine the AKP government replacing the military as the hegemonic 
institution, as there was no longer any authority above the civil government. The third chapter 
further analyses the growing authoritarian trend, most particularly in the years since 2013. 
Two theoretical frameworks will be adopted in this thesis. First, Samuel Huntington on civil-
military relations as it sets out main features on civil-military relations in liberal democracies 
and therefore it is possible to analyse Turkey‟s shortcomings. Huntington‟s article 
“Reforming Civil-Military Relations” focuses on the „new‟ democracies transition of civil-
military relations in the 1990s which is particularly helpful as Turkey‟s civil-military 
relations share similarities with the „new‟ democracies. The second theoretical framework 
will be to consider Turkey as a “competitive authoritarian” regime defined by Levitsky and 
Way‟s article “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” as it gives criteria as to why 
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Turkey no longer can be considered a democracy but has not turned into a full authoritarian 
regime. Turkey has an intriguing political system which further adds to the debate on 
authoritarianism and the growing grey area between a democracy and authoritarian regime. 
The growing grey area is a worldwide occurrence and the thesis attempts to further analyse 
differences of full authoritarianism and partly authoritarian regimes. Turkey also differs to 
the common belief that a democratization shift in civil-military relations does not guarantee a 
wider democratization process, as it did in Spain and Greece.  
The paper will use primary sources to support the claim of growing authoritarian rule 
by examining the closure of private and public institutions, such as media outlets and schools 
as well as the decline of free speech and press freedom in Turkey. These primary sources 
include human rights reports, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House. It is also 
necessary to use a variety of primary sources, including news articles as there is a lack of 
secondary sources about the aftermath of the 15
th
 July. Furthermore there are no secondary 
sources on Turkey‟s recent constitutional referendum. Additional to news reports the paper 
will make use of EU Commission reports on Turkey to explain legal changes to Turkey‟s 
civil-military relations and human rights record.  
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I) To save democracy from itself 
This chapter will investigate the military‟s history, and the reasons for its power and 
influence in political affairs. To fully comprehend the significance of the changes in the civil-
military relations, it is important to examine the Turkish military‟s powerful position in 
Turkish society and politics and the reasons as to why it achieved such political power. It has 
a prominent and important role in Turkish society due to its history as the institution 
establishing the modern Turkish Republic and as a modernization force. Furthermore from 
the foundation of the Turkish Republic the Turkish military gained influence as a result of 
perceived threats to its security, this led to the military establishing an important position 
within domestic politics. In the final part of this chapter previous coups will be examined and 
what measures the military took in the aftermath to further strengthen its grip on politics.  It 
will also investigate the paradox of coups being orchestrated by the military which in Turkey 
has always been a modernization force, especially in the promotion of democracy. A 
statement released by the military in 1960 to justify the coup was to “rescue Turkish 
democracy from the unfortunate situation it had found itself in” which gives a good insight to 
the military on its self-imposed role as a promoter of democracy.  
 
The Turkish military and its history  
For a long time the Turkish Armed Forced had been considered a modernization 
force, particularly in the promotion of democracy. Even before the establishment of the 
modern Turkish Republic, the military officers in the Ottoman Empire had a more modern 
outlook in terms of governance than officials in other institutions. This was due to the fact 
that Ottoman military officers received Western education thus acquiring a Western belief 
that a modern government has to be based on pluralism and debate and not a single sultan. 
This resulted in military leaders check on the sultanate‟s authority, such as the Young Turk 
Revolt and the downfall of Sultan Abdulhamit II‟s absolute regime in 1908 after he discarded 
the 1876 Constitution and parliament, which were eventually reinstated under pressure of 
Ottoman military officers (Varol, 2013: 730-731). The military continued being the most 
modern institution in Turkey throughout the early stages of the twentieth century. After 
World War One and the Ottoman Empire‟s defeat, the country was parted and occupied by 
Allied Forces. As the sultanate was unwilling to resist the occupying Allied forces it was 
military officers that started the Turkish War of Independence (Yildriz, 2014: 396) and thus 
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establishing the Turkish Republic in 1923 and gaining independence under the military 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As the Turkish military was the institution gaining 
independence and establishing the new sovereign country it has been regarded as a respected 
institution. This was evident until the early 2000s, according to the Eurobarometer there was 
a high public confidence and trust (up to 90 per cent) in the military among all social classes 
and demographics, considerably higher than other institutions in Turkey and higher than the 
average EU member state (Gürsoy, 2012: 11).  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the military valued traditions of Ottoman past but 
admired Western civilization and believed that Turkey had to modernize. To emulate 
Western powers and modernize, Atatürk and the military leadership regarded the creation of a 
liberal democracy as a necessity, this included a pluralistic political order (Varol, 2013: 731). 
Atatürk believed that further modernization efforts were necessary and radically reformed the 
old Ottoman Empire. His most radical reform was the strict separation of religion and state, 
known as secularism; therefore the formerly Islamic-based Ottoman Empire was transformed 
into the secular Turkish Republic. The political alterations to the new Republic indicated 
Turkey‟s ideological shift to the West, as the changes included new legal codes based on 
European models, the change of Arabic to Latin writing (Bowering, 2013: 49), emancipating 
women to an even further degree than in most European countries and a progressive 
education system, which were also based on Western values. The values and ideology set out 
by Atatürk is referred to as Kemalism and was adopted by the Turkish military and state and 
enshrined in the 1924 Constitution (Earle, 1925). Atatürk further founded the first and until 
1946 sole political party, the Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) which is 
based on six constitutional principles: “republicanism, nationalism, populism, revolutionism, 
secularism and statism (economically)
1” (Los Angeles Times, 1991). Since Atatürk‟s death in 
1938 the Turkish military regarded itself as the guardian of the six constitutional principles 
that the CHP are based on (Heper, 2005: 35). Therefore any act that would threaten one of the 
six constitutional principles would threaten the Turkish state. As the principles of the CHP 
and the military are the same the Turkish Armed Forces have often favoured the secular CHP.  
                                                          
1
 Republicanism – is the republican system of Turkey that replaced the previous Ottoman sultanate. 
   Nationalism – a new Turkish national identity that replaced the former Ottoman Islamic identity. 
   Populism – a more classless society. 
   Revolutionism – a principle to justify complete change from the Ottoman to Turkish system. 
   Secularism – a great decrease of Islam in the state and instead the adoption of Western principles. 
   Statism – a centralized and state-led economy.  
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 The Turkish military also modernized on an individual level. Compulsory military 
service required citizens from rural areas to attend the army and the military‟s aim was to 
train modern soldiers and also create modern citizens. Therefore recruits started to take 
courses in reading, writing, arithmetic and social studies. Additionally, through deployment 
soldiers were assigned to different regions within Turkey exposing them to diverse 
populations. The military not only modernized recruits in the area but also rural districts. Due 
to large military deployments in rural eastern Turkish districts, they further supported modern 
developments in these areas, including expanding and modernizing the infrastructure 
therefore connecting rural eastern Anatolia with large western Turkish metropolitan cities as 
well as creating educational centres (Varol, 2013: 732-733). The Turkish military was further 
modernized and internationalized after Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and officers were sent 
abroad. Furthermore Turkey joined in several international missions, such as the Korean War, 
which further increased its efficiency and effectiveness (Heper, 2005: 34). The military 
therefore developed into the “most serious, well-organized, and effective institution” in 
Turkey and by the time of the first coup in 1960, the military had established its central 
position in society as a “modern social institution and a crucial agent of modernization” 
(Varol, 2013: 731). 
 
Further consolidation of power through perceived threats 
Apart from being a respected institution and a modernization force the Turkish 
military also had to consolidate its power in domestic politics for it to enjoy the importance it 
did. Ismet Akça  and Evren Balta-Paker cite Michael Desch that the “strength of the civilian 
control over the military is based on the degree of internal and external threats” and if the 
internal threats are high and external threats low, the military gains greater influence and 
power in politics. In the case of Turkey, internal threats remained very high throughout the 
twentieth century (Akça and Balta-Paker, 2013: 78). This is supported by Ahmet T. Kurdu 
who argues that the military was able to obtain ideological allies through the perceived 
internal threats and therefore the military establishment had the ability to consolidate its 
power in domestic politics. As aforementioned the Turkish military‟s role was to protect 
Turkey from internal and external threats, these threats included Islamic political movements, 
Kurdish separatism and communism. These perceived threats provided the military with 
ideologically powerful civilian allies in the judiciary, political parties, the media and some 
sectors of society which enabled the military with political power and encouragement to 
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influence domestic politics for half a century. These civilians embraced assertive secularism, 
Turkish nationalism and anti-communism. As a result of these perceived threats, the most 
effective way to avoid them was for the military to maintain oversight over the civilian 
government. With the three threats persisting the military was able to justify its role in 
politics (Kurdu, 2012: 38).  The claim of perceived threats strengthening the military‟s 
political power is also supported by Yildriz, as he cites Ergun Özbudun, who argues that the 
“Turkish military will continue to intervene in politics as long as these internal threats exist” 
(Yildriz, 2014: 388). Especially after the 1980 coup this view was strengthened as the 
military pledged to protect unitary and secularism against the perceived threats of Kurdish 
separatism and Islamist activities (Gürsoy, 2012: 742). Therefore democracy as experienced 
in the West was never completely established as a result of military tutelage over politics. 
This lead to elected governments consistent struggles with the military. 
 
Military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997)  
The chapter so far has pointed out the reasons as to why the military was capable to 
intervene in politics. This was due to the Turkish military‟s public and the civilian elite‟s 
support as a result of its history and perceived threats. In the next part of this chapter the 
paper will analyse the reasons and the paradox of the previous military interventions and how 
the military used the coups to further consolidate its power in domestic politics. The military 
intervened and dissolved elected governments four times, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. As 
aforementioned the Turkish military was a modernization force and promoted democracy as 
one of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‟s main beliefs. The question therefore remains that if the 
military as an institution considered democracy as an important part of a modern country, 
why did it intervene in domestic politics, especially as a coup is deemed as very 
undemocratic.  
In all four military intervention the Turkish Armed Forces did not perceive the 
intervention as an anti-democratic act as each time it considered the Turkish state or 
constitutional principles threatened.  As aforementioned until 1946 Turkey was under a single 
party rule, Atatürk‟s Republican People‟s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP).  However, 
from 1946 until 1950 Turkey transformed into a multi-party regime with the Democratic 
Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) as the main opposition party. The CHP and the DP differed 
greatly in cultural and political affairs. The CHP was secular, represented the country‟s elite 
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and was supported by the military. The DP was a populist, anti-bureaucratic party which 
represented a large rural population and by 1950 they won the general election (Varol, 2012: 
323). The DP government quickly turned authoritarian, through various methods attempting 
to suppress the CHP. These methods included forced retirement to CHP-friendly civil 
servants and judges, as well as passing laws to weaken CHP-friendly media and the DP 
government froze financial assets held by the CHP. Additionally to its authoritarian shift the 
DP also exploited religion to influence people, threating secularism and republicanism. This 
led to nation-wide popular protests in 1960. In response the DP called for martial law and 
ordered the military to suppress the protests by shooting at protestors. However, segments of 
the military, primarily young officers, supported protestors and instead launched a popular 
military coup on May 25, 1960 (Varol, 2012: 324-325). The military therefore released a 
statement in which it justified the coup by saying it was necessary to “rescue Turkish 
democracy from the unfortunate situation it had found itself in” (Varol, 2012: 326). The 
leader of the DP and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes along with other cabinet members 
were arrested, trialled and executed. The 1960 military coup d‟état is considered a 
“democratic coup” by Ozan Varol as it fits into his definition that “the military responds to 
popular opposition against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime and facilitates free and fair 
elections in a short period of time” (Varol, 2012: 294). The term of a “democratic coup” has 
been contested by scholars and is debatable, especially regarding issues of democratic 
progress (George Derpanopoulos et al., 2016: 6). Nevertheless it has to be stated that the 
military did not set up a long lasting regime and elections were held in 1961. However, the 
1960 coup and the subsequent constitution strengthened the military‟s grip on political 
affairs, which can be argued to hinder the progress of democracy. The 1961 Constitution 
institutionalized the military by creating the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu, MGK). The MGK is a council which is attended by military commanders and 
civilian leaders; its primary role is to advise government officials on “national security and 
coordination”. This led to the legal obligation of the military to participate in political affairs 
(Heper, 2005: 35). The military also interpreted the constitutional phrase of “national security 
and coordination” broadly and included many domestic and foreign policies (Varol, 2013: 
740).  
In 1961 a multi-party democracy was re-established and elections were held but the 
DP was banned as a political party. However, Turkey experienced violent clashes between 
right-wing and left-wing students throughout the 1960s and early 1970s which turned more 
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deadly. The then-PM Süleyman Demirel appeared hesitant to take action to end the violence, 
partly because the 1960 coup was a result of the government violently supressing protestors. 
Additionally to violent unrests, the economy was stagnating and senior generals delivered an 
ultimatum to the government, which is also known as a coup by memorandum. The cabinet 
resigned and a cabinet of technocrats was established. The military was also authorized to 
take stronger measures against internal disorder and several arrests followed the coup (Harris, 
2011: 206). The 1971 coup was therefore not a direct intervention by the military and new 
elections were held in 1973. The 1970s also saw the emergence of more overt political 
Islamic parties, nevertheless, Turkey‟s politics was mainly overshadowed by weak coalition 
governments which resulted in political deadlocks. Added to the political problems, violence 
between right and left wing groups continued. To stabilize the country the military staged a 
coup d‟état on September 12, 1980. The Chief of Staff Kenan Evran took power and the 
parliament was dissolved and all political affairs were placed under military control (Harris, 
2011: 209). The 1980 coup d‟état is considered the most violent direct military intervention 
in Turkey. Fifty people were executed and allegedly hundreds of thousands were arrested 
with several hundred dying in custody (The Economist, Feb. 2013). The 1961 Constitution 
was reformed to the 1982 Constitution and furthered increased the military influence in 
politics. The MGK increased the military commanders in the Council and therefore the 
military gained control of it, with a military member also established as the General Secretary 
and therefore setting the agenda. After the 1980 coup the MGK changed from an advisory 
body to an instructing body (Varol, 2012: 332-333).  
The coups from 1960 to 1980 were primarily designed to protect democracy and the 
Republic‟s ideology of Kemalism. In 1960 the military intervened primarily to stop Turkey 
shifting more authoritarian and refused to shoot protestors. In 1972 and 1980 the military 
intervened to save the country from what it perceived as weak civilian governments and stop 
wide-spread internal violence. The last military intervention in 1997 was not to save 
democracy but secularism. With the threat of communism disappearing and the decline of 
political unrests and violence, political Islam was the major threat to the Turkish Republic. A 
good insight to the Turkish military‟s high command‟s view on Turkish democracy and 
secularism is a statement by General Cevik Bir just before the military intervention. He stated 
the following: “In Turkey, we have a marriage of Islam and democracy … The child of this 
marriage is secularism. Now this child gets sick from time to time. The Turkish Armed 
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Forces is the doctor which saves the child. Depending on how sick the kid is, we administer 
the necessary medicine to make sure the child recuperates" (Dickson, 2014: 188).  
 The 1997 military intervention is often referred to as the post-modern coup, as the 
military did not take full control of the government and the coup was achieved through more 
peaceful means and less radical changes to the political system than previous coups. In 1997 
the military forced the Prime Minister Erbakan to sign declarations to protect secularism in 
the Turkish education system, such as enforcing a headscarf ban at universities; it also placed 
state control over media outlets which have been critical towards the Armed Forces. Erbakan 
resigned and was banned for life as well as the Welfare Party, an Islamic political party. 
However, the parliament was not dissolved and the constitution was not amended (Dickson, 
2014; 188-189).   
By analysing the four military interventions in political affairs, it can be understood 
that the military believed its interventions were primarily to save Turkey, either from 
authoritarianism, inefficient governments, internal unrests or political Islam. Especially the 
coups from 1960 to 1980 were supported and not contested by the majority of the public and 
elites, as the civilian governments were incapable of establishing order and stability (Gürsoy, 
2012; 742). Every time the military intervened it served in the interest of the state in order to 
protect Turkey, Kemalism and its constitution. It is important to note that the military 
restored elections after each intervention and did not intend to establish a long-term military 
government. However, the military consolidated its political power further after each coup by 
drafting a new constitution increasing its autonomy and political power, most notably by 
establishing the National Security Council with which they obtained the ability to force out 
cabinets (Gürsoy, 2012: 742-743). Even though the military believed it saved democracy, a 
liberal democracy cannot be consolidated if the military has political powers, prerogatives 
and has the ability to disrupt the political system (Gürsoy, 2012: 7).  
 
Chapter conclusion 
This chapter outlined the military‟s ability to gain strength in political affairs. This was 
due to the military‟s history as it has always been a trusted and highly respected institution. It 
was further a modernization force and promoted democracy in Turkey to a certain degree. 
Perceived threats throughout the second half of the twentieth century further consolidated the 
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military‟s involvement in politics. The military‟s intervention in domestic politics was never 
primarily to increase its power but as stated to tackle threats to the Republic, such as 
communist groups and political Islam. However, the coups also consolidated the military‟s 
power as a show of force and by drafting constitutions which were beneficial to the military. 
This meant that by the end of the twentieth century the military was the country‟s hegemonic 
institution with the ability to dissolve governments at will.   
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II) The Shift of Civil-Military Relations 
This chapter will analyse the changes made regarding the civil-military relations in 
the Turkish Republic. As the thesis is concerned about the effect of the shift of civil-military 
relations on the political system it is important to understand the methods the civil 
government applied to enact its control, especially in the years following 2007 and the power 
struggle between Kemalists and Islamists. As outlined in the previous chapter the Turkish 
military had an enormous influence in domestic politics, which increased throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. By the end of the century the Turkish military had 
established itself as the most powerful institution in the country and possessed the ability to 
dismiss an elected government through a memorandum without much condemnation by the 
media, public or civilian elites, which was evident during the 1997 post-modern coup.  
This chapter will outline major factors of the civil-military shift. This paper primarily 
focuses on events after 2007. However, to comprehend the military‟s decrease in political 
affairs post-2007 one needs to examine certain changing developments before 2007. Pre-2007 
Turkey initiated a democratization process primarily to join the European Union under a 
strong AKP mandate, contrary to previously weak coalition governments. The main focus in 
this chapter are developments post-2007, these include further strengthening of the civil 
government and investigations into a deep state terror network „Ergenekon‟ which led to the 
arrest of several active and retired high-ranking military officers that had been accused of 
planning a military coup in the early years of the AKP government this caused the military to 
lose its legitimacy in public and politics, constitutional changes in 2010 and the discharge of 
high ranking officers. Finally, this chapter will assess the failed coup d‟état in 2016, the clear 
division within the military and the aftermath and effects of the attempted coup. All of these 
factors changed the balance and strengthened the civil government‟s control. 
 
Characteristics of civil-military relations in industrial democracies 
As this chapter is related to civil-military relations the theoretical framework adopted 
will be by Samuel Huntington. The article referred to in this chapter was written in 1995 
during a time of transition of authoritarian regimes to what Huntington describes as „new‟ 
democracies. Included are military regimes which bare resemblance to the military tutelage in 
Turkey. Huntington identifies four factors which characterize civil-military relations in 
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industrial democracies, which he termed as „objective civilian control‟. These include a high 
degree of professionalism within the military and the leadership‟s acknowledgement of the 
limits of their capability. The second factor is the military‟s subjection to the civilian 
government and the civilian government‟s responsibility of foreign and military policies. 
Thirdly, the government must accept and recognize an area of professional ability and 
independence for the military. Finally, as a result of these three factors a military intervention 
in politics is greatly minimized (Huntington, 1995: 9-10). This chapter will identify to what 
extent Turkey has completed these characteristics.  
Furthermore, Huntington describes what methods „new‟ democratic governments 
implement in order to limit the military‟s influence and political involvement and the reasons 
for the civil government‟s success. The methods include a more centralized staff in order to 
control the military, civilians replacing military officers in influential and important political 
offices, the elimination of special military institutions applying political power and the 
enhancement of military professionalism through new doctrine and curriculum in military 
schools (Huntington, 1995: 12). By examining the methods it is possible to identify the 
various methods the Turkish government used to subordinate the military and to what extent 
they differ to the methods used by „new‟ democracies. Therefore it will be possible to 
recognize how unique and distinctive the methods used by the Turkish government are.   
 
Democratization process pre-2007 (EU accession talks and the AKP government) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter after the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the country underwent a radical modernization process based on Western ideas. 
Therefore the civilian elites of Turkey identified themselves as Western and thus European. It 
is therefore to no surprise that Turkey sought to join the European integration project at 
various times. As early as 1963 Turkey and the European Community (the EU‟s predecessor) 
signed agreements on trade and financial matters, with the prospect of full membership in the 
future. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s Turkey‟s prospect of EU membership 
remained distant due to various economic and political issues and differences with certain EU 
members, such as Greece. Throughout the 1990s Turkey continued attempting to join the 
European integration process, the newly named and restructured European Union. However, 
the EU seemed unwilling to grant Turkey membership due to various reasons ranging from 
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lack of human rights and democratization to political disagreements with Greece, an EU 
member state with the ability to veto (EUCE, 2008: 1-3). 
However, by 1999, only two years after the military forced the Islamic Welfare Party 
out of government, Turkey was granted status of an applicant for EU membership by the 
Helsinki European Council. However, many political, social and economic reforms had to be 
undertaken before Turkey was granted full membership. As this chapter focuses on civil-
military relations in Turkey, only this factor will be examined. The European Commission 
report on Turkey‟s progress in 1999 stated the concern of the lack of civilian control of the 
military and the major influence of the military in political affairs through the National 
Security Council (MGK) (European Commission, 1999: 8). For Turkey to join the European 
Union it had to undertake radical changes to the civil-military relations, especially 
restructuring the MGK and thus limiting the military‟s influence in domestic politics. The EU 
accession talks ensued just three years before the Turkish elections after another weak 
coalition had collapsed and Turkey had been hit by another economic crisis. The newly 
founded conservative-Islamic Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the elections with over 34 per cent of the vote which 
granted them a strong mandate. Although, the AKP is considered a moderate conservative 
Islamic party, it was distinct from previous Turkish Islamic parties. Differently to previous 
Islamic parties, the AKP adopted liberal democratic values, a less assertive foreign policy and 
it also favoured Turkey joining the European Union. The AKP furthermore stated its support 
for secularism and the importance for democracy; in their party programme they argued that 
religion is important in a person‟s social life but not in politics (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009: 
958). These two developments marked the start of radical changes to Turkey‟s civil-military 
relations. Especially, the leader of the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who 
had previously been imprisoned while Mayor of Istanbul by the military as a result of 
breaking secular law, was a powerful charismatic figure and a staunch critic of the military 
tutelage. 
The European Union sets democratic civil-military conditions for any member state 
attempting to join, which are prevalent in Western developed countries. These factors are an 
important component of Western democracies. As the EU is an institution comprised of 
industrial liberal democracies their democratic consolidation conditions share similarities to 
Samuel Huntington‟s factors. The conditions to join the EU are set out in the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) which “aims to prevent the military‟s influence in politics 
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and subordinates the military to interests of a democratic society” (Güler and Bölücek, 2016: 
251). As aforementioned the National Security Council (MGK) was a body for the military to 
directly influence Turkish politics, therefore it was necessary for the government to reform it. 
On July 23, 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed the seventh harmonization package which 
greatly altered the MGK‟s functions. The civilian members of the council were increased and 
the appointment of the Secretary General of the Council was transferred from the military‟s 
Chief of Staff to a civilian member, thus setting the agenda. The legislative changes further 
limited the military‟s access as well as desecuritized civilian institutions, such as removing 
military representatives from the Higher Education Council and the Supreme Board for Radio 
and Television. Direct military intervention was reduced in the MGK reforms and thus turned 
the MGK into an advisory role which it was initially set up for (Bardakçi, 2013: 412-413). 
Another factor decreasing the military‟s influence in politics was the AKP‟s change in 
foreign policy. Turkey introduced the “zero problem policy” in which they use soft power as 
a foreign policy tool. Turkey‟s adoption of soft power, such as economy-based policies, 
further decreased the military‟s relevance in foreign affairs (Bardakçi, 2013: 413-414). The 
changes severely limited the military‟s influence in politics and further democratized the 
country. Additionally to a softer approach to foreign affairs, Turkey also successfully 
combated the internal threat of Kurdish separatism, after the perceived communist threat 
largely disappeared due to the end of the Cold War. In 1999 Abdullah Öcalan, the leader and 
founder of the Kurdish separatist group, the Kurdish Worker‟s Party (PKK), was arrested by 
the Turkish Intelligence Service. Subsequent peace talks throughout the 2000s greatly 
reduced the threat of Kurdish separatism (Akça and Balta-Paker, 2013: 78).   
In the attempt to join the European Union and Erdoğan‟s drive to democratize the 
country the military had lost considerable influence by 2007. However, even though the 
military lost power and influence it still yielded more than most other institutions in Turkey. 
This was very evident as between the AKP assumed power and the second election in 2007, 
senior military officers intervened through informal methods, such as speeches, press 
statements and declarations. Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2002- 2006) and his predecessor 
Yaşar Büyükanıt used these methods when opposed to AKP policies, especially when 
believed the AKP threatened secularism (Yildriz; 2014: 390). One of these instances was in 
2006 during the debate of the headscarf ban at universities, as the military openly sided with 
the secular coalition (Akça and Balta-Paker, 2013: 84) thereby interfering in a political 
debate, which in a Western democracy is very rare. However, even though the military 
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believed that secularism was under threat it did not intervene as the then-Chief of Staff 
Özkök was opposed to a military intervention stating it was not the military‟s role to govern 
the country (Heper, 2005: 216). 
 
Post-2007 (AKP’s consolidation of power) 
2007 was a year of even more radical change than the previous five years. 2007 was 
the year of presidential elections and the AKP government appointed the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and co-founder of the AKP Abdullah Gül as a candidate. Gül was a controversial 
choice due to the fact that his wife wore a headscarf and he was known to be involved in 
political Islam and therefore perceived as a threat to Turkish secularism. The presidential 
elections turned into a political crisis with several demonstrations throughout the country 
opposing the appointment of the AKP. The military along with secular civilian elites again 
intervened informally by stating that the president had to be committed to secularism in 
essence and not just words. Additionally to voicing their dissatisfaction the General Staff 
published a memorandum on April 27, 2007, stating that due to recent developments the 
fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey were under threat and the military may have to 
intervene. However, differently to previous governments, the AKP government did not back 
down and instead released a counter statement in which the military was criticized as 
undemocratic and reminding the Chief of Staff that he was under the subordination of the 
Prime Minister (Akça and Balta-Paker, 2013: 84). Along with AKP‟s criticism, the European 
Union also criticized the military‟s interference in the 2007 presidential elections (EU 
Commission, 2007: 9). The support of the West further legitimized AKP‟s claim and 
strengthened their position in the upcoming elections. During the political crisis the AKP 
called for early general elections, primarily to reinforce their legitimacy in government and 
strengthen their mandate; during the election campaign secularism was a core topic. The 
AKP‟s economic success and EU-friendly attitude over the previous five years resulted in the 
AKP acquiring support from liberal elites and academics. Additionally to the economic 
improvements in rural areas and the AKP‟s promotion of Islam further increased their rural 
support (Bardakçi, 2013: 414). The AKP won the elections by a large margin, increasing their 
votes to 46.6 per cent (62 per cent of seats in parliament). By winning with such a strong 
mandate the AKP legitimized their rule and transformed into a powerful and hegemonic 
party. Shortly after the general elections Gül was appointed President by the Turkish 
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parliament (Akça and Balta-Paker, 2013: 84-85).  This was a clear victory by the government 
and a sign that the military no longer dictated what the government does. 
The civil-military relations were in favour of the military in the previous century 
partly due to the support from Kemalist civilian elites. This support helped the military to 
consolidate and exercise their power. This was especially evident in the 1997 post-modern 
coup as the civilian elite played a major role in forcing the government out of office, such as 
authorizing the media to warn the public of Islamist fundamentalism. Therefore it was 
necessary for the AKP to acquire the support of the civilian elite to consolidate their own 
power. The shift of civilian elites came in the expense of Kemalists and the previously 
disadvantaged Islamists benefitted from the AKP‟s years in government. The AKP obtained 
considerable financial and political support from religious businesses which were mainly 
situated in Anatolia, and referred to as the Anatolian or Islamic bourgeoisie.
2
 Previously to 
the AKP government, these businesses had been suppressed and blacklisted by the military. 
These businesses flourished under the early years of the AKP and provided it with a socio-
economic base. The AKP also acquired the support of several Islamist media organizations, 
which expanded their share and power throughout the AKP years in office. Failing media 
organizations were purchased by the state and sold to AKP-friendly media institutions, thus 
significantly increasing the number of Islamic media in Turkey. By 2009 Islamist-funded 
media outlets controlled 19 daily newspapers, 120 magazines, 51 radio stations and 20 TV 
channels. The media further scrutinized and criticised any wrongdoings by the military while 
praising the government‟s work. The higher education also shifted from the Kemalist 
establishment to the Islamist civilian establishment, due to President Gül‟s ability to appoint 
new members of the Higher Education Council as well as directors of universities. 
Furthermore there was a large increase of private schools and universities being established 
during the AKP‟s years in office, many of them funded by the Islamic bourgeoisie (Bardakçi, 
2013: 415). With the civilian elites shifting, the military lost considerable amount of power to 
the AKP and was no longer able to use Kemalist elites to intervene in politics.  
 
                                                          
2
 The Anatolian or “Islamic bourgeoisie” is the term used to describe entrepreneurs raised in villages and towns 
in rural Anatolia with an Islamic conservative background. For most of Turkey‟s history they were marginalized 
by the Turkish Republic as it favoured secular-orientated big city bourgeoisie and businesses. However, since 
the opening up of the economy in the 1990s (Yavuc, 2006: 5-6) and especially since the AKP‟s successive 
governments they have increased businesses and influence. More on Islamic bourgeoisie can be found in 
Yavuc‟s “The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti, The University of Utah Press, 2006” 
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Ergenekon trials and its consequences (2007-2014)  
By 2007 the AKP had introduced reforms to curb the military‟s influence in political 
affairs. Additionally to it the AKP had secured important civil elites and with a large majority 
in parliament they also established their legitimacy as the governing political party. However, 
the biggest shift in civil-military relations were the Ergenekon investigations and the 
subsequent uncovering of alleged coup plots which started in 2007. Due to length of this 
paper, it will primarily focus on the investigation‟s impact on the civil-military relations and 
only give a quick overview of the alleged coup plots.  
In June 2007 the police discovered an alleged deep state terrorist organization, known 
as “Ergenekon Terrorist Organization”, which involved several retired and active military 
officers as well as secular civilians, such as journalists, academicians and businessmen. The 
Ergenekon organization was discovered after police had raided a house in a district in 
Istanbul and several weapons were located. In coordinated raids several secular military 
officers and civilians were arrested and trialled. The defendants were charged with the 
involvement in a terrorist organization and attempts to discredit the AKP government by 
creating an atmosphere of terror in which several leading figures, including Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and Chief of Staff Büyükanıt were planned to be assassinated. They were also 
accused of planning bomb attacks in several cities, thereby legitimising a military 
intervention. After the first wave of arrests other alleged coup plots linked with Ergenekon 
were uncovered and several more primarily active and retired military officers were arrested 
and trialled. In 2012 the former Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ was arrested for his involvement 
in the Ergenekon Terrorist Organization (Bardakçi, 2013: 418). Başbuğ denied any 
wrongdoings stating the accusations against him as “tragicomic” given the fact that the head 
of the armed forces of one of the most powerful armies was a member of a terrorist 
organization (Hurriyet, 2012). Furthermore a second trial under the name Balyoz 
(Sledgehammer) was opened in July 2010 implicating 350 officers for attempting to 
overthrow the Turkish government in the year 2003 by shooting down an airplane over the 
Aegean Sea and thus justifying a military coup. In the trials the former First Army 
commander, the commanders of the Air Force and Navy were each sentenced to twenty years 
in prison (Gürsoy, 2014: 269).  
The Ergenekon investigations changed the balance of power. The Turkish Armed 
Forces lost its public status, it was unable to effectively resist the reforms and reduction in 
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power (Gürsoy, 2014: 270), more of which followed in the 2010 constitutional amendments. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the Turkish military enjoyed high public confidence 
and as a result previous coups were rarely opposed by the public. In fact there was 
widespread public support in the interventions in 1960, 1972 and 1980. The scholar Yaprak 
Gürsoy utilized the Eurobarometer to measure trust and confidence in the military. In early 
2000s around 87 per cent of surveyed people trusted the military which was considerably 
higher than any other institution in Turkey, as the government, parliament, legislative system 
and political parties scored lower. Public trust in the military in Turkey was also higher than 
in other EU member states. However, due to several investigations and court cases, trust in 
the military has dropped radically from 2007 onwards. By 2010 only 70 per cent trusted the 
military which was the same as other EU member states. However, people that did not trust 
the military increased from 10 per cent in 2004 to 27 per cent in 2010, which was 
considerably higher than the EU average (Gürsoy, 2012: 11). The loss of trust in the military 
was evident in the attempted coup d‟état in 2016, as thousands of opposed civilians battled 
rebellious soldiers on the streets.   
The second effect of the Ergenekon investigations was the justification for 
constitutional amendments in 2010 which occurred at the same time as the Ergenekon trials. 
The Constitutional amendments were approved by fifty-eight per cent and had two effects on 
the secular establishment, one amendment targeting the secular judiciary and another 
amendment targeting the military. By 2010 both institutions were still monopolized by the 
Kemalist establishment and thus represented a danger to the AKP government and an 
obstacle to Islamic conservative policies. It was another important step in curbing the secular 
elites‟ power and influence. Previously to the amendments the HSYK officials (a court 
responsible for judges and public prosecutors) were selected by two high courts, with secular 
tendencies. Therefore the secular judiciary had a strong control over the AKP government 
and its conservative policies. However, the 2010 Constitutional amendments diversified the 
HSYK and the Constitutional Court by restructuring the system ensuring more representation 
and pluralism; this weakened the secular tutelage control over the AKP government. The 
second amendment weakened the secular elites by limiting previous privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by military personnel. Several amendments were made to various articles 
to achieve this. Crimes committed by military personnel against the „constitutional order of 
the state‟ are no longer tried in military courts but instead in civilian courts (Özbudun, 2014: 
156). Following these constitutional changes trials against former president and 1980 coup 
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leader Kenan Evren and officers that participated in the 1997 memorandum including 
General Çevik Bir were launched in 2012 (Bardakci, 2013: 421). The trials against former 
military leaders demonstrated the end of the military‟s hegemony and indicated that no one is 
above the law. These amendments severely impaired military and judiciary challenges 
towards the AKP government (Özbudun, 2014: 156). Constitutional amendments were not 
the only legislative changes the AKP government implemented as a response to the 
Ergenekon trials. Further legislative changes decreased the possibility of the military‟s 
interference in politics. One of the changes was the amendment of article 35 of the Armed 
Forces Internal Service Code. The Internal Service Code previously stated to protect Turkey 
from threats, not stressing on internal or external threats, thereby justifying military 
interventions in domestic politics. The newly adopted article explicitly stresses that the 
military‟s duty is to defend the country from threats and dangers from abroad, thus 
eliminating any possibility on internal threats to the secular Republic (Bardakci, 2013: 421). 
The third effect the Ergenekon investigations had were the military‟s inability to 
promote high ranking officers. The Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meets yearly and is 
responsible for the promotion, assignments and dismissal of high ranking military officers. 
New amendments secured military officers from suspension if suspected to be involved in 
Islamist activities. Previously, decisions by YAŞ could not be overturned (Bardakci, 2013: 
421). Prime Minister Erdoğan intervened in the promotions and blocked several officers who 
were deemed hostile towards the AKP. Previously, a civilian intervening in the promotion of 
military officers was very rare (Jenkings, 2011).  However, many military officers could not 
be promoted as they were suspects in investigations, even though none were convicted by the 
time of the Supreme Military Council meeting. Due to the inability of the military to promote 
officers and the continuation of court cases against active and retired officers the then-Chief 
of Staff General Kosaner and the commander of the Land Forces, Air Forces and Navy 
simultaneously retired out of protest. General Kosaner accused the investigations as a 
conspiracy case and stated that the investigations portrayed the military like a criminal 
organization. He further added that the situation (the investigations) had “prevented him to 
fulfil his duties to protect the rights of his personnel and thereby rendered him unable to 
continue this high office (…)” (Tuysuz and Tavernise, 2011). The simultaneous resignations 
by the high-ranking officers highlighted the little power left in the military as they were 
unable to intervene.  
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The Ergenekon investigations and subsequent trials had wide-ranging effects on the 
secular establishment and civil-military relations by severely weakening the former 
hegemonic military institution and secular elites. However, while praised by many as a 
milestone and defining moment in Turkish history and the introduction of democracy, it also 
had many critics who stressed that the Ergenekon trials were a witch-hunt against the former 
secular elite and Kemalist bourgeoisie by the new Islamist elites allied with Erdoğan, most 
notably the Hizmet movement by the Islamic cleric Fettulah Gülen. As aforementioned large 
parts of the secular establishment was eliminated through the Ergenekon investigations and 
wide-ranging legislative changes. Since 2014 it has been confirmed that the trials were 
orchestrated by members of the Hizmet movement, partly on fabricated coup plots (Basaran, 
2016). By 2016 the court of appeals has overturned the convictions of several imprisoned 
officers and civilians; this included General Ilker Başbuğ, who was released in March 2014 
(Solaker, 2016). To comprehend events post-2014 it is vital to understand Gülen and the 
Hizmet movement. Therefore the next part will analyse Gülen and his followers who have 
also been accused of orchestrating the 2016 coup d‟état attempt by the Turkish government 
and several observers.  
 
Gülen’s Hizmet movement 
To comprehend the possibility of Gülen‟s involvement in the 2016 coup d‟état 
attempt one has to examine the movement‟s history and its ties to the AKP government. 
Gülen is an influential moderate Islamic cleric who operates a large network of private 
schools, mostly in Muslim countries, he has a large following and the movement is often 
referred to as the Hizmet movement. In 1999 videotapes emerged in which he openly told 
followers to infiltrate the state system without being noticed. However, he had fled Turkey 
previously and had lived in a self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. Under the Turkish secular 
establishment and military tutelage he could not extradite much power or influence (Yavuc 
and Koc, 2016: 138). AKP‟s victory in 2002 gave Gülen and his followers the chance to gain 
influence in the expense of Kemalists. To counter the secular establishment as mentioned 
earlier, Erdoğan allied with the Islamic bourgeoisie, one of the most prominent and powerful 
Islamic businessmen and cleric was Fettulah Gülen, as his members were well-educated and 
competent bureaucrats who could fill important posts, mostly in the police and judiciary 
during the early AKP administration (Yavuc and Koc, 2016: 136). To further weaken the 
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secular elites, Erdoğan relied on Gülen followers to eliminate the secular threat as they 
ensued with the Ergenekon investigations in 2007. As mentioned earlier it is known that 
some coup plots and thus evidence were fabricated (Basaran, 2016). It is believed that some 
members of Hizmet also infiltrated the staunchly secular military and by the dismissal of 
several high ranking officers during the investigations, Hizmet members managed to fill the 
newly vacated positions. Furthermore, as aforementioned as a result of a 2010 Constitutional 
amendments the YAŞ was no longer able to dismiss officers on suspicion of religious 
activities, which enabled officers in the Hizmet movement to quickly rise in the ranks. 
However, a power struggle between Erdoğan and Gülen slowly started, as both attempted to 
gain more power. The struggle started with Gülen followers who were close to Erdoğan 
wiretapping the Prime Ministers‟ house and office. Subsequently Erdoğan ordered the closure 
of several schools which were operated by Gülen thus cutting off his main financial support 
and pool of recruitment. The struggle escalated into an all-out war in December 2013 when 
Turkish police detained 47 people on corruption charges; this included the sons of three 
ministers and close allies to Erdoğan, it also implicated Erdoğan‟s family in corruption cases. 
Media controlled by Gülen reported extensively on the corruption charges and undermined 
the AKP government and Erdoğan. Erdoğan responded by large scale dismissals of police 
officers and officials in the judiciary (Yavuc and Koc, 2016: 139-140). However, by 2013 
several members of the Gülen movement were deeply rooted in many institutions and hard to 
trace, including the military. By 2016 Gülen was deemed as a great threat to Erdoğan, much 
greater than the weakened secular Kemalists. 
 
2016 attempted coup d’état  
This part will quickly outline as to what happened during the attempted coup d‟état. 
The coup started in the evening of 15
th
 July 2016, with several pro-coup troops seizing 
control of the Bosporus bridges in Istanbul therefore cutting the city in half; several 
democratic institutions were attacked by the Turkish Air Force throughout the night, mostly 
in Ankara and Istanbul. The international airport in Istanbul was also temporarily taken over 
while police officers were arrested by soldiers. It was quickly revealed that only a minority of 
the military force was involved and it was not operated under the chain of command; as the 
General Staff Headquarters was attacked and the Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar along with other 
high ranking officers were arrested by pro-coup plotters. This resulted in pro-government 
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military forces and police fighting rebellious soldiers in the barracks and on the streets. As 
quickly as the coup started it ended, once Erdoğan launched a message to his supporters to go 
on the streets and fight the rebellious soldiers. Furthermore, there was no face to the coup and 
no one to challenge Erdoğan. Erdoğan arrived in Istanbul later that night which signalled the 
end of the attempted coup (Milan, 2016: 29-30). By the morning of the 16
th
 July hundreds of 
civilians and soldiers were dead and thousands injured. In the aftermath several unarmed 
conscripted soldiers were attacked by mobs and some reports that soldiers were lynched. 
Furthermore, purges first against the military started and widened to other institutions which 
will be examined more closely in the next chapter. The Turkish government was quickly to 
accuse Fettulah Gülen as the mastermind behind the coup and his followers of orchestrating 
it. Even though many scholars and many news outlets in outside of Turkey believe that the 
Gülen movement was involved, no reliable evidence has been published by the Turkish 
government regarding Gülen‟s involvement. The US government has repeatedly asked to be 
provided with evidence so Gülen can be extradited to Turkey; however, at the point of 
writing none has been provided. In the immediate aftermath Erdoğan stated that the attempted 
coup was a „gift of god‟ to rid the system from Gülenists (Milan, 2016: 30). This made some 
critics of Erdoğan, including Gülen, claim that it was a „false-flag‟ and staged by Erdoğan to 
justify further purges and dismiss anyone critical to him, during the state of emergency it is 
possible to accelerate dismissals. However, many observers believe that the coup went too far 
and dangerous for Erdoğan to stage it (Basaran, 2016). 
 
Effects of the coup on the civil-military relations 
The attempted coup exposed the divisions within the Turkish Armed Forces as well as 
the failure by the Turkish military leadership to effectively quell internal issues. It therefore 
had an impact on the public image, as the military had already suffered from the Ergenekon 
investigations. This was particularly evident as contrary to previous coups, when the public 
and the Republican Party (CHP) supported military control, the public fought pro-coup 
soldier and the opposition parties immediately denounced the attempted coup. Furthermore, it 
highlighted the shift of civil-military relations in favour of the civil government but at the 
same time it demonstrated remaining issues facing the government. In the last 20 years the 
Turkish government attempted to increase its control over the military, through formal 
procedures, such as constitutional and legislative changes as well as informal methods, such 
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as the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations and subsequent mass arrests. However, the 
attempted coup demonstrated to the government that complete control had not been achieved 
and the necessity to implement further changes to the military structure. This part of the 
chapter will examine the effects of the attempted coup and the government‟s plan to 
restructure the military. By the 5
th
 August 2016, over 3,000 members of the military had been 
dismissed including more than 40 per cent of generals. The government announced that the 
military will be put under tighter governmental control to prevent any future coups (Solaker 
and Taksabay, 2016). The changes include that the Chief of Staff will be appointed directly 
by the President and not the YAŞ. There will be direct governmental control by balancing the 
numbers of cabinet ministers and generals in the YAŞ. The head of the Air Force, Navy and 
Land Forces will directly report to the Minister of Defence instead of the Chief of Staff. 
Furthermore, the military education system will be completely restructured as Military High 
Schools and academies will be closed and merged into a new National University of Defence 
operated by the Ministry of Defence and not the Turkish Armed Forces. Finally, units and 
facilities will be modified; the paramilitary units (the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard) will be 
completely subjected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs while military facilities, such as 
shipyards and hospitals, will be transferred from military oversight to the Ministry of 
National Defence and the Ministry of Health (Haugom, 2016). By implementing these 
changes the military will be tightly controlled by the government.  
 
Overview and current civil-military relations in Turkey 
This chapter has outlined the changes in the civil-military relations since the EU 
accession talks until the aftermath of the 2016 coup d‟état attempt. Additionally to the shift of 
civil-military relations, this chapter also examined the increase of Islamist elites in the 
expense of the military‟s long term ally, the secular Kemalist establishment.  
Finally, by assessing Turkey‟s recent shift in civil-military relations one can see more 
resemblance with Samuel Huntington‟s criteria. As mentioned in this chapter the military has 
increasingly become more subordinate to the civil government and the Turkish government 
decides on foreign and military policies. Even though civil-military relations have shifted 
there were still some persisting issues which were particularly apparent in the 2016 coup 
d‟état attempt. The four reasons of success outlined by Huntington have to a certain extent 
been accomplished by the Turkish government, especially after the failed coup. The military 
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has increasingly been under tighter control of the Ministry of Defence. The special military 
institutions, such as the MGK and YAŞ, have not been disbanded but greatly reformed and 
no longer exercise political power. Therefore sharing some resemblance to Huntington‟s 
„new ‟democracies, as the military no longer possesses a platform to direct policies. In most 
governmental position civilians had already replaced military officers, such as the Presidency 
in Turkey. Finally, military education will be changed into a more open National University 
of Defence. According to Samuel Huntington these reforms minimize an attempted military 
intervention, a belief shared by the Turkish government. Therefore the Turkish government 
has democratized civil-military relations. However, another issue is Turkey‟s informal and 
undemocratic methods of shifting the relations. This became more evident after 2007 with 
some fabricated coup plots and large scale arrests. Furthermore, the lack of fair trials was a 
great concern to international observers (European Commission, 2011: 6). On one hand civil-
military relations in Turkey are more democratic while on the other hand the methods 
adopted to achieve this are not democratic. The four criteria of industrial democratic civil-
military relations are no longer unique features of well-established democracies but also less 
democratic countries and it especially highlights the blurred line between democracies and 
authoritarian regimes. This leads to the final chapter and analysis. This chapter examined the 
shift in civil-military relations and the next part will analyse how it affected democracy and 
authoritarianism in Turkey. 
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III) A Political and Ideological Change 
This chapter will assess Turkey‟s current increasing authoritarian rule. The early years 
of the AKP and the so-called “Turkish Model” were hailed around the world. In the Arab 
world it was presented as a perfect model on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 
Western leaders were also impressed by Turkey‟s „improving democratic standards, 
economic performance and regional influence‟ (Taspinar, 2014: 49). The biggest 
achievement of the AKP was the complete subordination of the military to civilian control as 
described in the previous chapter. This also meant that the civilian government replaced the 
military as the hegemonic institution in the country. Even though Turkey is no longer a 
military tutelage the country has not democratized and instead it can be argued it has shifted 
more authoritarian. This has been especially visible in recent years and Erdoğan‟s complete 
failure to liberalize and democratize the country, which was a main pillar of the AKP‟s 
policies. The major shift was that the old type of authoritarianism, in which the military and 
the secular bureaucratic elites have been replaced by the new civilian Islamist authoritarian 
regime (Tapsimar, 2014: 50).  
This chapter will assess the criteria for a democracy and Turkey‟s historical 
challenges and issues to meet the criteria. As stated even though Turkey is no longer a 
military tutelage and the government successfully achieved superiority of the military, it 
cannot be described as a democracy due to persisting problems, most notably the lack of civil 
liberties. The chapter will further analyse Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way‟s definition of 
competitive authoritarianism and to what extent the current political situation in Turkey fits 
into the definition. By analysing current changes I will argue that Turkey is shifting towards a 
one man full-scale authoritarian regime, which has been especially evident since the 
attempted 2016 coup.  
 
The failure of establishing democracy 
Firstly, the civil competitive authoritarianism to which I will add Turkey must be 
distinguished from a democracy. To be regarded as a democratic nation one country must 
fulfil certain criteria and by examining these it is evident that Turkey cannot be regarded as a 
democracy. The criteria include the open and free elections of executive and legislative actors 
by all adults that possess the „right to vote‟. A democratic country further ensures political 
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rights and civil liberties to all members within the state, including the freedom to criticize and 
scrutinize the government without retaliation. Finally, the elected authorities are not 
subjected to any other institution or actor, such as the military, and enjoy authority to govern. 
If the violations are frequent and serious and thus create a favourable position for the 
governing actor a country can no longer be described as democratic (Levitsky and Way, 
2002: 53). By examining the criteria it is clear that Turkey was never a complete democracy. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, from 1960 onwards successive Turkish governments were 
subjected to the military and did not possess the authority to govern without interference. 
Furthermore, throughout Turkey‟s history it has struggled with political rights and civil 
liberties. Even though Turkey signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the 
issue of human rights did not enter the political agenda until three decades later, after the 
1980 coup. The 1980 coup and its subsequent brutal crackdown on left and right wing groups 
alarmed international human rights organizations. However, the lack of human rights 
persisted in Turkey through the 1990s mainly in the southeast of Turkey during the armed 
conflict with the outlawed separatist Kurdish Workers‟ Party (PKK). The human rights 
violations in Turkey ranged from torture to extrajudicial killings and death during 
incarceration (Casier, 2009: 3-4). During the mid-2000s and the peace process human rights 
improved, however, issues still prevailed and Turkey was not at a level permitted by the 
European Union (European Commission, 2011: 21). Political rights were also restricted in 
Turkey and even though parties were usually permitted to run at elections, after each military 
intervention certain parties, often parties with Islamic tendencies, were banned and the 
opposition leaders jailed. This happened as late as the 1997 post-modern coup when the 
Islamist Welfare Party was banned.  
The political landscape has changed considerably after the turn of the century and the 
government is no longer subjected to the military. However, this does not mean the 
government has democratized the country as it clearly lacks political rights and civil liberties. 
Especially in recent years and the end of the liberal „Turkish model‟ certain democratic 
criteria have deteriorated considerably, most notable in „individual rights and liberties, 
independent media and the increasing lack of separation of legislative, executive and judicial 
powers‟ (Taspinar, 2014: 50).  The possibly greatest difference of Turkey and a democratic 
country, as known as in the West, is the growing tendency of the complete disregard for civil 
liberties and human rights in Turkey. Although human rights improved throughout the 2000s 
as aforementioned, human rights quickly deteriorated after 2012. This was first highlighted in 
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the brutal crackdown of protests in the summer 2013 at Gezi Park. The Gezi Park protests 
started as an environmentalist protest to stop the park in Istanbul to be turned into a shopping 
mall. However, due to the violent crackdown by the police it grew into wider protests against 
the growing authoritarian practice by the government and the attack on the secular lifestyle 
through speeches and laws passed by the AKP government (Özbudun, 2014: 157). The 
excessive use of force by the security services were heavily criticised by the international 
community and highlighted the lack of civil liberties in Turkey. Additionally to physical 
force the police used chemical irritants, such as pepper spray and tear gas to disperse 
protestors. After a month of country wide protests over 8,000 people were reported to have 
been injured and another three civilians died, the deaths were linked to excessive use of force 
by the police (Amnesty International, 2013: 6-8). Since the Gezi Park protests in 2013 civil 
liberties and political rights have further deteriorated every year. In the 2017 Freedom House 
report Turkey is considered „not free‟ in the categories of civil liberties and political rights 
(Freedom House, 2017). The lack of human rights was further brought into focus in the 
aftermath of the failed 2016 coup and the state of emergency. Since the coup, reports of 
human rights violations have accelerated to a level not experienced in Turkey since the 1980 
coup. Over 100,000 public officials have been dismissed and tens of thousands have been 
arrested since the coup on anti-terror laws. According to Amnesty International there have 
been reports of wide spread abuse and torture within prisons including abuse of alleged 
members of the failed coup and the PKK. Since the failed coup the length of detention 
without trial has been extended to thirty days due to the state of emergency, which further 
highlights the decline of civil liberties in Turkey (Amnesty International, 2017). Additionally 
to the decline of civil liberties, political rights have also deteriorated in recent years. After the 
ceasefire between Turkey and the PKK collapsed, the government accused the Kurdish 
opposition party (HDP) of being a proxy for the PKK and subsequently members have been 
jailed, threatened and attacked. By 2017, 2,700 local HDP politicians have been jailed 
(Freedom House, 2017). The lack of civil liberties and political rights clearly illustrate that 
Turkey cannot be considered as a modern democracy.  
 
Turkey as a civil competitive authoritarian regime 
As Turkey cannot be defined as a modern democracy this part will examine the 
theoretical framework of competitive authoritarianism and to what extent Turkey fits into it. 
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Furthermore it will argue that Turkey is shifting to a more authoritarian regime than a modern 
democracy. Four contested arenas are the defining features of a competitive authoritarian 
regime, which distinguishes it from a full-scale authoritarian regime. The contested arenas are 
methods in which the opposition can defeat the incumbent; these include elections, the 
legislative branch, the judiciary and the media. However, as soon as the four contested arenas 
have been eliminated a regime has shifted to full authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 
53).  
The first contested arena is the electoral arena. In competitive authoritarian regimes 
elections are often bitterly fought and include large scale abuses by the government; these 
include the use of state resources, biased media coverage, attacks on opposition candidates 
and activists and the lack of transparency. However, it is unlikely that results are manipulated 
as it could greatly damage the legitimacy and thus the governing party (Levitsky and Way, 
2002: 55). Two of the most recent elections in Turkey, the 2014 Presidential election and the 
2015, have been plagued with reports of irregularities by domestic and international 
observers. Both election campaigns were accused by observers of media biased and 
censorship. Even though the 2015 parliamentary elections were transparent media restrictions 
and violence prevented campaigns for opposition parties. However, unlike the 2015 elections, 
the 2014 presidential election even included electoral fraud and a lack of transparency 
(Freedom House, 2017). The government was accused of mass fraud again in the 2017 
referendum for a constitutional change which grants President Erdoğan unprecedented 
powers (Reuters, 2017). Turkey‟s recent elections featured the characteristics of a 
competitive authoritarian regime.  
The second contested arena is the legislative arena. In full authoritarian regimes the 
legislative branch does not exist or is in complete control of the ruling party. However, in a 
competitive authoritarian country the legislative branch is weak and often a major area for the 
opposition to challenge the ruling party (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 55-56). The legislative 
branch in Turkey is the Turkish Grand National Assembly, also known as the parliament. 
Since 2002 the AKP holds the majority of seats in parliament, however, the opposition often 
use it as a platform to challenge the AKP. Due to AKP‟s consistent majority the opposition is 
limited in challenging the ruling party through legislative actions. President Erdoğan‟s 
growing strength was apparent when Prime Minister Davutoğlu, the head of the country, was 
ousted after an alleged disagreement in May 2016. The Prime Minister was replaced by 
Binali Yıldırım, a close ally of Erdoğan. The coup and the subsequent state of emergency 
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further weakened the legislative branch. During the state of emergency the government can 
rule by decree gaining the ability to „pass bills that have to force of law‟. These can only be 
overturned by the parliament. However, the AKP holds a majority in the parliament as well 
making it further unlikely that bills will be overturned (Shaheen and Bowcott, 2016). The 
largest change to the legislative branch has come with the 2017 referendum as it allows the 
Turkish President to issue decrees on „political, social and economic issues that would carry 
the use of force‟. This would make the President the head of state and the head of government 
further limiting the parliament‟s power (Ekim and Kirişci, 2017). The legislative arena is still 
an area contested as the opposition has used it to challenge the government and tensions are 
high in parliament. In early 2017 a „brawl‟ erupted in the parliament further indicating high 
tensions between the opposition and the ruling party (Cakir and Smith-Spark, 2017). 
However, the legislative arena has become less effective each year as Erdoğan tightens his 
grip on the country, including the Turkish parliament. 
The third contested arena is the judicial arena. In a competitive authoritarian regime 
the government continuously attempts to subordinate the judiciary through various methods, 
including impeachment, bribery and extortion. Even though the government attempts to 
control the judiciary it is unlikely that judges are punished when acting against the governing 
party, as the regime could lose legitimacy (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 56-57). Turkey‟s 
government has attempted to subordinate the judiciary on several occasions and has 
succeeded many times. Traditionally the judiciary in Turkey was secular, however, this 
changed with the constitutional amendments in 2010, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The government claimed that the amendments were necessary to diversify the judiciary. 
Contrary to the government, critics of the AKP instead believe that the amendments were 
introduced to add judges and prosecutors with favourable view to the AKP in high courts 
(Özbudun, 2014: 156). The amendments altered the structure of the judiciary system but the 
most noticeable attempt to subordinate the judiciary was during the 2013-2014 corruption 
scandals.  The corruption scandals started with a wave of arrests with close allies to Erdoğan 
charged with corruption. Soon after the first wave of arrests a recording of Erdoğan and his 
son surfaced discussing methods to hide millions of euros. Erdoğan immediately responded 
by sacking the lead prosecutor, reassigning hundreds of police chiefs, replacing 96 
prosecutors and judges. He further introduced new laws in which the judiciary was under 
tighter control of the government and rewriting laws for the government to control future 
corruption investigations (Taspinar, 2014: 52-53). Another radical change happened in the 
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aftermath of the coup, as 4,000 prosecutors and judges have been dismissed and subsequently 
arrested on charges of links to the Gülen network (Pitel, 2017). Recently Erdoğan possesses 
the power to dismiss judges and prosecutors at will with no retribution. He will further 
strengthen his grip on the judiciary once the new constitution is in force. In the new 
constitution the President of Turkey appoints nearly half the members of the Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), who in turn oversee all appointments, promotions and 
transfers (Pitel, 2017). 
The final and fourth arena of contest is the media. In competitive authoritarian 
regimes independent media are legal and often influential as watchdogs investigating and 
exposing the government. In fully authoritarian countries the media is completely state-
owned and heavily repressed and censored (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 57). Press Freedom has 
rapidly declined in Turkey over the last years and reached unprecedented levels of restricted 
freedom after the 2016 coup. Turkey is currently ranked 155 out of 179 in the World Press 
Freedom Index, below countries that have been repeatedly condemned for media restrictions 
and censorships, such as Zimbabwe, Burma and most Middle Eastern countries (Reporters 
without Borders, 2017). According to a survey by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 
Turkey has highest number of imprisoned journalists worldwide. 89 journalists are currently 
imprisoned in Turkey which is over a third of all imprisoned journalists worldwide. However, 
exact numbers are impossible to verify and the actual number is believed to be over 100. 
Additionally over 100 media outlets have been forcibly shut down by the government after 
the attempted coup (Greenwslade, 2016). The targeted media ranged from outlets with 
alleged links to Gülen, some secular media and also Kurdish media outlets or any perceived 
as critical towards Erdoğan. The press freedom status for Turkey on Freedom House is 
currently „not free‟ (Freedom House, 2017). Although some independent media still exists in 
Turkey, such as Cumhuriyet, journalists are regularly harassed, attacked, threatened or 
imprisoned.
3
 By arresting great numbers of journalists and shutting down several media 
outlets; Turkey is moving towards full authoritarianism as independent media has declined 
rapidly over the last years. 
Prior to the failed coup it was possible to define Turkey as a competitive authoritarian 
regime as many arenas were contested. However, in the past 12 months Turkey‟s political 
                                                          
3
 Cumhuriyet is a centre-left secular daily newspaper. It gained international prominence in 2014 when two 
journalists uncovered a plot by the Turkish Intelligence Service to illegally send arms to Syria. Both journalists 
were subsequently charged for revealing state secrets and sentenced to 5 years and 10 months in prison 
(Yeginsu, 2016) 
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system has further shifted authoritarian. Therefore the definition by Levitsky and Way of 
competitive authoritarianism is helpful in understanding Turkey‟s shifting position but does 
not accurately describe Turkey‟s current political situation. The contested arenas are no 
longer as influential and competitive as experienced in a competitive authoritarian regime. 
Turkey can also not be completely regarded as an authoritarian regime as there is a visible 
opposition within the country attempting to challenge the growing authoritarian shift. Due to 
the current political climate a re-assessment of competitive and full authoritarianism with 
Turkey as a case study could provide important literature for future studies.  
 
Turkey’s shift to a one-man Islamic authoritarian regime 
As mentioned in this chapter, Turkey has long struggled to democratize the country. 
Therefore the paper does not claim that Turkey has turned from a democratic country to an 
authoritarian regime. It argues that Turkey‟s ruling party, elites and hegemonic institution 
have changed. From the founding of the Turkish Republic, Turkey had continuous issues of 
adopting democracy as known in the West. Until 1946 it was a single-party state ruled by 
Atatürk‟s party. From 1960 the military effectively controlled the country and had the ability 
to intervene and dismiss governments. The inability of democratizing the country for such a 
large period of time has been cited as the problem for the lack of democracy the current 
government has established. As the country never underwent a complete democratic 
transition it also lacked democratic institutions and many institutions had a lack of 
accountability. Furthermore for historical reasons, the AKP as an Islamic party developed a 
mental attitude of „conquer rather than democratize‟ state institutions (Somer, 2016: 485-
486). Similarly Levitsky and Way state that one reason for a competitive authoritarian regime 
to be formed is the collapse of a former authoritarian regime and the emergence of a new 
regime. They state that democratic traditions within the society are weak and there is an 
absence of democratic institutions thus allowing the new regime to adopt more authoritarian 
tendencies (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 60). As a result the already existing authoritarian 
system in Turkey was largely unchanged but the Turkish leadership‟s ideology changed. The 
previously secular leadership and Kemalist ideology supported by the military were replaced 
by the AKP and its conservative-Islamic ideology (Somer, 2016: 482). This was only 
possible after the AKP successfully subordinated the military. However, most striking is the 
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popularity and the party‟s personification in one man, which is the current President, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan.  
As Erdoğan has tightened his grip on the country it is important to comprehend his 
perception of democracy. Erdoğan has a very majoritarian conception of democracy, as he 
believes that elections are the only „legitimate tool of accountability‟ (Özbudun, 2014: 157). 
During the Gezi Park protests he dismissed the protestors as „hooligans‟ with no regard to 
democracy and reiterated that only elections matter. As mentioned in this chapter a 
democracy cannot simply be reduced to elections and Erdoğan‟s growing grip on power is 
continuously distancing democracy. After the failed 2016 coup and the subsequent state of 
emergency Erdoğan managed to silence his opponents in the judiciary and media by labelling 
them as terrorist or as having links with terrorists, which as aforementioned resulted in the 
dismissal of thousands and the arrest of many others. The legislative branch is still one where 
the opposition can raise their voice but the AKP has majority and it is no more than a 
discussion platform. In April 2017 a referendum was held on a constitutional change, critics 
have argued that the new constitution removes the separation of powers of the legislative, 
executive and judiciary, which in Turkey had already been weakened (Kingsley, 2017). 
Finally, the four contested arenas are decreasing and two nearly completely eliminated: the 
judiciary and the legislative branch. The independent media is also declining and only one 
arena of contest remains crucial, the electoral. As elections are the only factor in a democracy 
that Erdoğan respects, according to his own interpretation of democracy. However, Erdoğan 
is still very popular especially in Anatolia which is most evident at rallies and the popular 
resistance during the coup, although recent elections and the referendum have suggested his 
popularity is declining. This is particularly apparent as the AKP has been losing seats in the 
parliament since 2007 and most notably a majority in 2015 which resulted in a snap election a 
few months later in which they then won with a majority. However, the AKP only won a 
majority in 2015 as a result of growing security issues and a climate of fear (Bardakçi, 2016: 
15). 
The latest election was the referendum in 2017 which was closer than many predicted. 
Furthermore Erdoğan lost in the major cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Antalya 
(Kinglsey, 2017). Even though the later elections have been close, by 2017 he has still never 
lost an election and one cannot know if he will accept a defeat considering the powerful 
position he currently holds. Furthermore there have also been claims of major electoral fraud 
in the 2017 referendum which is uncommon for a competitive authoritarian regime due to the 
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possibility of loss of legitimacy.  However, in a full-authoritarian country electoral fraud is 
common. Although Turkey cannot be regarded as a full-scale authoritarian regime, the recent 
accusations of electoral fraud are a strong indication of Turkey‟s continuous shift to full-scale 
authoritarianism. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis gave an overview on Turkey‟s political system and helped understand how 
the shift in civil-military relations in the twenty-first century changed the long lasting 
political system. From the founding of the Turkish Republic the military was the most 
efficient and modern institution in Turkey and the self-appointed protector of its state 
ideology „Kemalism‟ thus defending Turkey from internal threats, most notably political 
Islam. Due to its self-appointed role the military intervened four times as an attempt to “save” 
Turkey. In 1960 the military ousted the government in a popular coup to prevent the 
government‟s increasingly authoritarian rule. In 1971 and 1980 to stop internal unrests and in 
1997 the military intervened to protect secularism. After each intervention the military 
tightened its control over political affairs through special institutions and constitutional 
amendments. By the end of the twentieth century the civil-military relations were in favour of 
the armed forces and the country was a military tutelage.  The shift in civil-military relations 
started after the country‟s attempt to join the European Union. It was necessary for Turkey to 
introduce a democratization process in order to join the EU. However, the military remained 
the dominant institution within Turkey until 2007. Two major developments were crucial to 
shift the civil-military relations. The governing AKP obtained a strong mandate with a clear 
majority in parliament and the Ergenekon and later the Balyoz (Sledgehammers) 
investigations occurred. The investigations into alleged coup plots had a three-fold effect on 
the military: the military lost its legitimacy, the government justified wide-ranging 
constitutional changes weakening the military and opening the judiciary to less assertive 
secular prosecutors and judges, and large numbers of high ranking military officers were 
arrested. Many of the arrested officers and secular civilians have been released after 
reassessing the evidence and identifying that many alleged coup plots were fabricated but the 
military had already been considerably weakened.   
The failed 2016 coup clearly indicated that even though the civil-military relations 
have shifted in the last twenty years there is still a lack of governmental control over the 
military. However, it was the first time in Turkish history that a military coup failed and it 
highlighted that the population no longer favours a military takeover. The failed coup 
emphasized the need to further change the civil-military relations. In the aftermath of the 
coup the government further tightened its control over the military and the AKP government 
has replaced the military as the new hegemonic institution. By further subordinating the 
military, the government is hopeful to avoid another military coup. However, contrary to 
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common assumption, the subordination of the military did not democratize the country, 
instead critics argue Turkey is shifting further authoritarian. The shift in civil-military 
relations did not affect the authoritarian system but the elites and ideology of the country. By 
subordinating the military the AKP government had the ability to replace the secular elite and 
with the growing Islamic bourgeoisie. This was achieved as the military no longer possesses 
the power to direct or oust an Islamic government. In recent years the AKP and especially the 
former Prime Minister and now President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have increasingly grown 
authoritarian.  
The constitutional referendum in 2017 has increased Erdoğan‟s power which he will 
most likely assume in 2019 after a presidential election. The new constitution will grant the 
President complete control of the government replacing the parliamentary system thus further 
erasing the separation of powers and limiting checks on Erdoğan. Furthermore, the President 
will have the possibility to govern for three terms if the second term is terminated and early 
elections are called. Hence he will have the possibility to govern for another 14 years after 
2019 as the leader of the country, until 2033 (Kingsley, 2017). Although Erdoğan has 
increased his powers nearly yearly there is still a visible opposition in Turkey and it is highly 
improbable that it will ever completely disappear. However, unlike last century it is very 
unlikely that the military still has the ability to intervene and oust the elected government or 
leader. From a democratic point the military should not politically interfere as it would 
further obstruct democratization and destabilize the country. Furthermore, by assessing 
Turkey‟s political system with Levitsky and Way‟s definition of a contested authoritarian 
regime, it is apparent that the some of the contested arenas set by Levitsky and Way are no 
longer completely contested. Therefore Turkey cannot completely be regarded as a 
competitive authoritarian regime. However, as there is a visibly opposition it cannot be 
considered as a full authoritarian regime. The political system of Turkey can be further 
assessed especially since the constitutional change and the aftermath of the coup and to what 
extent opposition have the ability to contest Erdoğan‟s growing authoritarian rule. 
Furthermore the region adds a wider framework to Levitsky and Way‟s competitive 
authoritarianism, as the article mostly focuses on Latin America and former Soviet states. As 
Levitsky and Way‟s article was written in 2002 it mainly analysed data from the 1990s which 
differs greatly from the current political situation in many states. Therefore eliminating some 
of the four contested arenas, as in Turkey‟s case does not automatically turn a country to a 
full authoritarian regime. The reason is that a visible opposition exists and can still contest the 
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incumbent yet unlikely through some of the four arenas. New methods can be analysed for 
the contested arenas such as social media which has been widely used and has played a 
prominent role in countries that attempt to silence oppositions, including Turkey. 
Furthermore even though Turkey is shifting more authoritarian mass rallies and protests are 
held around the country. Analysing the changes in Turkey‟s political system along with 
examining the opposition can widen the studies and add to the literature on the subject of 
democracy and authoritarianism and the growing grey area. 
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Appendix: Timeline on Turkish civil-military relations, post post-modern coup 
1999: Turkey granted status of applicant for EU membership 
2002: Liberal conservative AKP wins majority in Turkish general election 
2003: Government passes seventh harmonization package which desecuritized civilian 
institution and turns National Security Council into an advisory role 
2007: AKP win majority in Turkish general elections strengthening its mandate 
2007: The government defies the military‟s warnings and elect co-founder of the AKP 
Abdullah Gül as the Turkish President 
2007 – 2014: Ergenekon investigations and trials: Military officers and secular elite are 
imprisoned for an alleged coup plot in the early AKP years. Three effects: Delegitimizes the 
military, justifies constitutional amendments and inability to promote officers by the Supreme 
Military Council (YAŞ) 
2010: Another alleged coup plot uncovered by police, named Balyoz (Sledgehammer) 
involving 350 military officers 
2010: Constitutional amendments: Military officers tried in a civilian court. Government can 
appoint more prosecutors in the HSYK 
2011: Resignation of the 4 highest military officers due to the wave of arrests of military 
officers. Signals the apparent end of military interventions 
2012-2013: Alleged split between Prime Minister Erdoğan and influential cleric Gülen 
2014: Release of many military officers and secular elites. Erdoğan accuses Gülen movement 
of fabricating coup plots 
2016: Attempted coup d‟état by a fraction of the Turkish military. Turkish government 
blames Gülen supporters within the military for attempted coup. First failed military 
intervention in Turkey 
2016-2017: Mass arrests of military personnel. Wide ranging changes announced to further 
subordinate the Turkish military 
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